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A question often posed in theoretical discussions is whether
or not one person can make a difference in the ebb and flow
of history.

We might all agree that if that one person were

a President of the United states, a difference could be made;
but how much?

While the presidency is the single most powerful

position in the U.s. federal system of government, making it
a formidable force in world affairs also, most scholars agree
that the presidency, itself, is very limited, structurally.
The success of a president in setting the nation along a desired
course rests with the ingredients brought to the position by
the person elected to it.

Further, many events occur outside

the control of the president.

Fortune or failure depends upon

how the individual in office reacts to these variables.

The

truest test of presidential skills come when a president is
caught in a maelstrom of historic episodes.

In essence, this

is the subject of this paper.
Specifically, I propose to study the policy setting powers
of President Kennedy and the differences that his abilities
could have made to history had he not been assassinated.
President Kennedy governed in a time that was crucial to our
nation's progression, and he was cut down before he could fully
leave his imprint upon our country's heritage. This project
deals with the power of presidents in setting national policy
by analyzing the potential alternate reality that this man
could have set forth had the course of human events allowed.
In this, I shall focus on Kennedy's personal power in setting

national policy and the probable approach that he would have
taken to events that engulfed his successors.

In the end, I

hope to solidify the argument that one person can make a
difference though the disparity between our history and the
potential reality set forth in this project.

PRESIDENTIAL POWER

The power of the President of the United States to influence
events around him has rapidly evolved in the last century-
especially since Franklin Roosevelt inhabited the White House.
Today, much as it always has, a president's power "is the product
of his vantage points in government, together with his reputation
in the Washington community and his prestige outside" (Neustadt
131).

The vantage points to which Richard Neustadt referred

to in his excellent book, Presidential Power, have grown
considerably in the last half of a century with the massive
growth of governmental bureaucracy since Franklin Roosevelt
took office in 1932.

This has proven to be both a positive

and a negative for White House occupants in their attempts to
exercise executive control of national policy.
The presidency is an institution that shares power with
other forces in creating and implementing a national agenda.
Presidential power "exists only as a potential.

Leadership

is the means by which the president can exploit that potential"
(Shogan 5).

Structurally, the president must contend with

Congress to achieve policies through legislation and ratification
of foreign policies, though Congress has strongly deferred this
latter power to the President since World War II.

But

even with that concession, "great successes in u.s. foreign
policy tend to corne in those areas in which there is a consensus
and thus a continuity in policy" (Ambrose 123).

Further, the

press often serves as "the fourth branch of government", and
much can be achieved through their cooperation (Neustadt 26).
The President's cause becomes to persuade all of these differing
people that the President's cause should be their own (Neustadt
27).

Of this constant political burden, British journalist

Godfrey Hodgson said:
Never has anyone office had so much power as the president
of the United states possesses.

Never has so powerful

a leader been so impotent to do what he wants to do, and
what he is pledged to do, what he is expected to do, and
what he knows he must do (Shogan 5).
However, even with these limitations, the President remains
the pivotal power broker in the nation.

With the President's

powers of veto, appointments, access to the media, budgeting,
commander-in-chief, and head of the nation's bureaucratic
machine, to name just a few, a President commands the most
impressive array of persuasive vantage points in the American
system (Neustadt).

Through this potential for persuasion also

comes the power of bargaining with the many elements that share
power with the President, thus allowing him the capability of
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controlling the tempest of politics in his favor for specific
agenda goals.

In setting this agenda, there are still many

other factors that influence the success of a chief executive.
A President's image in Washington, D.C. often will determine
whether or not he can achieve the results he deems necessary,
but that image is a constantly fluctuating market in Washington
where other power brokers can position themselves for or against
the White House successfully, depending upon how the market
favors the President.

In this, lies a very simple axiom: "The

men he would persuade must be convinced in their own minds that
he has skill and will enough to use his advantages" (Neustadt
44).

Neustadt further goes to say that the "greatest danger

to a President's potential influence is not the show of
incapacity he shows today, but its apparent kinship . . • to
form a pattern. "

This would undermine confidence in the chief

executive, and it would stymie his policy setting potential.
Similarly, much of the same concept relates-to people
outside of Washington, D.C.

The average citizen is much more

insulated from the market value of Presidential influence than
political insiders.

But when the people do become affected

by it, the result can be staggering.

When people feel their

everyday lives touched directly by the machinations of the
president, true power can be irrevocably wielded or lost.

The

abilities that each person brings to this challenge are the
determinants of success.
In his book, The Riddle of Power, Robert Shogan outlines
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three major ingredients to evaluating Presidential power: the
ideology, the values, and the character of the person in the
Oval Office.

Much like a recipe, an amiable mix of these

components is necessary to success in White House.

The ideology

of a President provides a "broad philosophical framework for
deciding which policy goals matter most,.

a strategy that

allows him to achieve these goals" (Shogan 6).

Values provide

the moral epicenter for the President, and they are much more
deeply rooted in the foundation of the person than is the
ideology.

Shogan says that the values are responsible for the

personal conduct of the President.

"Character is the catalyst

that melds a president's ideology and values into his vision
for the country, which is the expression of his leaership"
(Shogan 7).

They are the person's "temperament" and

"inclinations" when in office (Shogan 7).

The formation of

these elements to form the Presidential puzzle are integral
to the success of the President.

If facing a crucial test,

a serious weakness in any of these areas can break both the
Presidency and the man holding it.

JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE ERA

In order to visualize the potential impact that President
"",,,e
Kennedy could~left upon history, we must first look at the era
during and after which he was President.

The 1960's were much

perceived to be a time of renewal and change.

Kennedy was a

symbol of this, himself, because he was such a contrast to his
predecessor, President Eisenhower, both in age and leadership
style, as he ushered in the new decade.
President Kennedy, in his Pulitzer Prize winning book,
Profiles in Courage, adequately described a major issue of the
time as the "seemingly unending war to which we have given the
curious epithet 'cold' • • . "

The complex global contest between

the Communist Soviet Union and the United States directly, or
peripherally, dominated almost all aspects of the United States'
foreign policy.

Most significant amongst the era's foreign

policy commitments were: circumventing Cuba as a threat to
national security through the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of
1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, protecting Western
Europe from Soviet aggression during the building of the Berlin
wall, checking Communist influence in Southeast Asian countries
such as Laos, Indonesia, and, most notably, Vietnam, and
balancing a determined military posture with the threat of
nuclear war in the high stakes poker game played between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The debilitating effect of the

Vietnam conflict upon the American prestige and psyche was
decisively the most disastrous setback for U.S. foreign policy
in the 20th Century, and its scars deeply rooted in a whole
generation.
On the domestic side, the U.S. was a growing powder keg
of tensions that eventually wreaked havoc within the social
and political mainstream.

Civil Rights, which was an important
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issue at home for the Kennedy administation, led to landmark
legislation in 1964 and 1965.

The "war" on poverty was a further

outgrowth of the Kennedy tenure that became the bulwark of the
Johnson era that proceeded it.

Finally, bitter public dissent

over the nation's involvement in Vietnam coupled with general
anger and disillusionment over the assassinations of President
Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy literally
tore apart the fabric of national order.

So vehement was this

discord, that nearly all of the achievements of the Johnson
administration were overshadowed and the President was engulfed
in a sea of discontent that prompted him not to seek re-election.

JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE MAN

In order to further discern the differences that Kennedy
might have made, we must determine what kind of power skills
JFK brought to the Oval Office and how he commanded them.

In

his approach to the political scene, Kennedy described himself
as an "idealist without illusions"

(Harper 12).

Robert Shogan

sets forth the premise that President Kennedy analyzed issues
in three ways:
The first was the definition of an issue in terms that
the public readily understood.

Second was the establishment

of realistic goals, taking into account the position of
his adversaries.

And finally,

the commitment to

presidential prestige and popularity to the struggle to

attain these goals (Shogan 80).
Though a romantic and idealist at heart, President Kennedy
disdained emotional responses or overreactions.

Often, in the

heat of crisis that each president inevitably faces, such
responses are inadvertantly unveiled.

"In all such situations

it appears that Kennedy was cool, collected, courteous, and
terse.

This does not mean that he was unemotional . • • But he

had schooled his temperament" (Neustadt 155).
This Kennedy is much different from the pop culture
mainstream that has today bestowed near legendary status upon
him.

Though his eloquent rhetoric was an instrument that

inspired an entire nation and caught the eye of the world, his
exercise of power was far more suited to rationalism than
idealism.

Kennedy operated his White House though a consistent

pattern: the convening of a command post for critical evaluation
of the situation at hand, hard .questioning and conception of
all possible options, maintenance of strict silence, and a
decision made by the President alone (Neustadt 152).

He was

determined never to react overzealously to any given situation
even if he had the power to do so.

Many claimed that his

cautious approach towards the exercise of his powers was a
betrayal of the bold, decisive figure he portrayed during his
campaign for office.
Indeed, as President Kennedy learned to "master the machine"
(Neustadt 151), he became more confident and understood how
to adapt in order avoid repeating mistakes.

Kennedy viewed

"the conservative outlook of the Congress and his slender
election victory in 1960" (Harper 17) as serious constraints
upon substantive opportunities for domestic achievements.

In

contrast, he "ran foreign policy almost without reference to
Congress" (Ambrose 125).

Nonetheless, by his third year, many

felt that he had undergone "a transformation from a hesitant
leader with unsure goals to a strong figure with deeply appealing
objectives" (Harper 14).

Further, his hard lesson learned in

the Bay of Pigs may have enabled him to muster the determination
necessary during the Cuban Missile crisis, and the lessons of
that victory may have paved the way towards his highly recognized
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union.
Wary of pressing too hard in his early years, he commented
that "Great innovations should not be forced on slender
majorities" (Harper 12).

In his memorable work, A Thousand

Days, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. noted that President Kennedy
looked forward to a second term in that it "would give

.the

congressional margin and the popular mandate the first had
lacked.

He saw his second administration • • • as the time of

great legislative action."

It would be fair to say that

Kennedy's approach in his first two years could have been
cautious to an extreme and definitely enough to anger many-
especially those involved in civil rights.

Regardless, "the

distinctive quality of Kennedy's leadership--the interplay of
the self-discipline that marked his character, the rationality
that reflected his values, and finally, his ability to adjust
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his ideology" were the central skills that John F. Kennedy
brought to the Oval Office (Shogan 99).

He, himself, offered

this reflection upon power at Amherst College in 1963:
The men who create power create an indispensable
contribution to the nations greatness, but the men who
question power • • • determine whether we use power or power
uses us.
This simple statement is powerfully symbolic of the reflective,
rational approach towards power that Kennedy exhibited in his
time in office.

JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE MISSED CHALLENGES

Given that President Kennedy planned to run for re-election,
many pivotal challenges awaited him had he not been assassinated.
Most significant amongst the issues Kennedy would have faced
were his pending bills dealing with civil rights and tax
reduction, implementing a still formulating strategy to combat
poverty, re-election, more widespread installment of his New
Economics, and what would have been, as Robert Shogan called
it, "the acid test of Kennedy's ability to lead"--Vietnam.
To speculate on much more would be haphazard in that how JFK
would have dealt with these issues could have spurred challenges
incalculable to us today.

However, concerning this particular

range of items, I believe that it is possible to lay a framework
for Kennedy's lost presidency.

II

In the area of civil rights, I propose that President
Kennedy would have successfully followed through on a
comprehensive agenda, though possibly at a slower rate than
President Lyndon Johnson did in our reality.

That JFK was an

ardent supporter of civil rights was never a question.

What

can reasonably be said about his approach to this issue was
that President Kennedy saw civil rights within the context of
the broad political landscape.

Kennedy's approach was consistent

with his standard method:
First . . . he established clear goals.

In the case of civil

rights, it was nothing less than the use of federal power
to strike down legal defenses of segregation. . .Then he
defined the problem, using the most forceful language ever
heard from an American president on the subject of race •
.

• Finally, Kennedy used his prestige to mobilize public

support and the backing of other national leaders . . •
(Shogan 98).
Kennedy was careful not to push too hard with his civil rights
agenda in fear that he would alienate his Southern support for
other issues and re-election (Brauer 316-17).

Finally, the

racial equality movement "overwhelmed him" and "forced him to
amend" his political approach (Harper 225).

Comprehensive civil

rights legislation was finally introduced to Congress in February
of 1963 by the President as the culmination of his methodical
path towards racial equality.
While this legislation came to be known as the historic
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Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed by President Johnson and his
political machinations, it is likely that President Kennedy
would have accomplished the same feat.
its passage was firm.

His commitment to

Kennedy commented that his "political

fortunes were riding on the legislation" (Brauer 273).

Richard

Neustadt came to the conclusion that JFK "came to see the risks
of social alienation as plainly as he saw the risks of nuclear
escalation."

Kennedy insider, Schlesinger concurred by

emphasizing that by the time of his assassination, his commitment
to civil rights was as vehement as that for peace.

Even "those

closest to the legislative process" later believed that Kennedy
would have pushed the civil rights bill through (Brauer 310).
As a matter of fact, Senate Minority Leader, Everett Dirksen
claimed that "its time had come", and Carl Albert said that
"it would have been adopted in essentially the same form whether
Kennedy lived or died"

(Schlesinger 1030).

In the area of civil rights, it is likely that an extended
Kennedy administration would have gone down in history, albeit
kicking and dragging along the way, as possibly the most
comprehensive advocate of racial equality since Abraham Lincoln.
Through language expressed before the introduction of the civil
rights bill, indications are that a Kennedy administration would
have likewise followed up with something comparable to Johnson's
voting Rights Act of 1965 (Brauer, Schlesinger).

Further, as

it was, the Kennedy administration set unprecedented standards
in minority appointments and executive action, specifically
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through the fierce administration of discrimination prosecutions
under Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

There is no reason to

assume that the Attorney General would not have been retained
for a second term in order to reinforce and broaden the efforts
made in the area of civil rights.

Similarly, it is likely that

with victories in the legislature and a possible re-election,
JFK would possibly have opened the door a bit more for minority
appointments.

With a greater margin of victory and more

congressional allies, Kennedy would have become the full fledged
usher, instead of the martyr, of what Carl Brauer called the
"Second Reconstruction."
In the less glamorous, but all important, area of economic
policy, the Kennedy administration was implementing a concept
that was dubbed "New Economics" (Harper).

This "pro-Keynesian"

approach for government called for a "policy (that) would now
be devoting to curing the ills" of the nation in a proactive
fashion (Harper 183 & 195).

This new form of economic stimulus

called for spurring the economy through its expansion and through
tax relief and tax reform.

In theory, this government action

would increase prosperity.

Kennedy, himself, was not fully

convinced of the theories of the New Economists until "mid 1962"
(Harper 195).

By this time, JFK, as in his approach to civil

rights, had become more independent and willing to take such
risks.

What ensued was the beginning of the Revenue Act of

1964.
In 1963, President Kennedy introduced legislation that
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eventually passed in 1964 under Lyndon Johnson that was called
the Revenue Act of 1964.

I propose that President Kennedy had

already made the effective sale of the legislation before his
death, and with the opportunity, the possible result could have
been greater economic growth in the 1960's.

As shown by Herb

Gebelein, the 1960's did show moderate growth (Harper 187-91).
Heavy expenditures on the Vietnam effort in the Johnson
era retarded the growth of the economy and undermined the tax
cut forwarded by the Kennedy administration by increasing
inflation (Harper 186).

Though the economic success under

Johnson was praised, Phillip M. Simpson argues that "Kennedy
would have at least rivaled Johnson's record" (Harper 204).
In all fairness, economics is a dangerous tiger to ride,
and to say that Kennedy would definitely have bettered Johnson
in economic policies is folly.

What is definite is that

President Kennedy believed his economic agenda to be his most
important domestic issue, affecting all others--including civil
rights, and he would have vigorously pursued a most assured
victory of his legislation had he lived (Harper & Schlesinger).
Likely, he would have continued this policy in a consistent
manner throughout his presidency.

However, because of his

absence, the concept was allowed to "idle" (Harper 180).
Further, akin as it was to Reaganomics, "there has been growing
doubt about whether such a project can be sustained" (Harper
180).

Ronald King calls Kennedy's economic policies "a beacon

of inspired if aborted achievement", and this achievement would
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have been on a course to continue (Harper 180).
As for the matter of re-election, I feel it safe to say
that President Kennedy had little to worry about.

As Schlesinger

noted, "He had little doubt. • . that he would win the election
with ease, especially against (Senator Barry) Goldwater."

With

probable victories in civil rights and a popular tax cut included
in the Revenue Act added to his maturation in foreign policy
(Cuban missile crisis and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), Kennedy
would have had many arms to bear against the right wing
extremist, Goldwater.

I doubt, however, that President Kennedy

would have won by the sweeping margin that Johnson did in
reality.

Though Kennedy skillfully avoided alienating the South

wing of his party with civil rights, he would have lost some
to the conservative Goldwater that Johnson, because of his
Southern heritage, did not.

Also, LBJ masterfully played

Kennedy's death on the political stage as to get all he could
out of it.
on his side.

Of course, JFK would not have had such raw emotion
In the end, however, Kennedy likely would have

won handily and received the mandate and congressional support
he needed to begin his "term of legislative action"
1016).

(Schlesinger

From that platform, Kennedy was to launch his poverty

programs and Medicare proposals that had been formulated for
1964 (Schlesinger 1010-14), but which, instead became the pillars
of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society.
No doubt, the most asked question concerning a theoretical
second term of John F. Kennedy is "Would he have gotten out

Ie

of Vietnam?"

Though this is by no means an easy question to

answer, given the approach President Kennedy appeared to display
in dealing with such matters, I believe that American involvement
in Vietnam would have been reduced and, eventually, would
have ended during a second Kennedy term.

The fact that President

Kennedy was committed to keeping Communism out of Southeast
Asia was indisputable.

Much effort had been made to prevent

Communism from rising to power in neighboring Laos (Schlesinger
320-42).

As a matter of fact, Vietnam was not even a foreign

policy priority until the end of his time in office (Rust).
Most likely, President Kennedy would not have made any firm
decisions on Vietnam until after the 1964 election, as did
Johnson, in order to stave a falling out as a result of any
bold action (Rust 181).
Following his probable re-election, Kennedy was to face
no tougher decision than to decide upon the escalation or de
escalation of u.S. troops and aid to

Viet~am.

Under his tenure,

he had already increased personnel from 2,000 to 16,000 in his
efforts to support the South Vietnamese government.

The

assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, the head of the South Vietnamese
government, only three weeks before his own death, disturbed
Kennedy more than anything since the Bay of Pigs (Schlesinger
997).

In November of 1963, the President asked his aide for

the Far East, Michael Forrestal, to prepare a study on
Vietnam options which would include the option of withdrawal.
Shogan, at this point says that "he believed that the U.S. had
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a commitment to that country, but he was determined to keep
that commitment limited."

Like under Johnson, I believe that

JFK would have put off firm commitment until it was no longer
possible.
In the Summer of 1964, in response to aggression by
Communists, President Johnson pressed the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution through Congress, giving the President a wide range
of deferred military options.

"Many congressmen later claimed

they had been tricked" into voting for this measure (Ambrose
126).

It would have been highly unlikely that Kennedy would

have approved of such a rash response to to the incident in
the Gulf.

It would have been very uncharacteristic of his

rational, unemotional approach to such matters.

Later, in 1965,

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara, the same men who served Kennedy, confronted President
Johnson with the prospect that a decision had to be made about
Vietnam.

It is very possible that the same recommendation,

around the same time frame would have been made to Kennedy if
he were around.
By this time, it had become apparent that U.S. policy in
Vietnam was not working and that between major escalation or
withdrawal, a path had to be chosen.

Here, I believe that

President Kennedy would have decided not to escalate American
involvement.

As Richard Neustadt suggests:

Given his age, experience, and temperament,

.given

the advantages in our domestic politics accorded to a man
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who had faced down Khruschev . • • 1 think he would have
kept his bombers and his combat troops away.
Similarly, William Rust states in his book, Kennedy in Vietnam,
that he "would not have crossed the covert action-advisory
threshold, would not have bombed North Vietnam, and would not
have committed u.S. ground troops to South Vietnam."

Finally,

as Robert Shogan points out:
For Kennedy not to have withdrawn these men, once he became
convinced that continued u.S. support for Vietnam would
mean an open-ended commitment for more troops, would have
fundamentally contradicted the rational approach to ideology
he had developed.

CONCLUSIONS

Though we shall never be granted the opportunity to fully
know what actions John F. Kennedy might have taken after November
22, 1963,

I have tried to set forth some plausible hypotheses.

In doing so, I have attempted to illuminate the powers of the
presidency and the differences that one person can make in their
approach to it through the example of President Kennedy.

Through

this example, I believe that one can definitely discern that
substantial historical differences would have been made.
In the event that President Kennedy had lived, along with
the information provided here, I submit that the ensuing
alternate reality would bear little resemblance to the one we
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know today.

First, with JFK alive and re-elected, Lyndon Johnson

would not have become President of the United States.

Johnson

had begun to fade into the shadows and contemplate retirement
before JFK's death.

Further, Kennedy, not Johnson, would be

remembered for landmark legislation in domestic issues, though
it is doubtful that Kennedy could, or would, have produced
anywhere near the massive legislative agenda that Lyndon Johnson
did in our reality.

On the flip side, however, with Kennedy

not committing the nation to the Vietnam conflict, the
legislative achievements would not have been drowned out as
were Johnson's.

Chances are, though, that Kennedy's prestige

would have been slightly tarnished for losing Southeast Asia
to the Communists--as was Truman's for "losing" China.
time would likely have cleared that up.

However,

Following the chain

of events as best possible, many other differences become
apparent.
Without a Vietnam to embroil and divide the nation, one
cannot help but believe that, despite unforseeable other factors,
the nation would not have been as bitter a place come the end
of President Kennedy's second term.

Without a Johnson and

Vietnam to run against, Robert Kennedy would not have been likely
to run for President in 1968, nor would he have been killed
after the California primary.

Such assurances cannot concretely

be made for Martin Luther King, Jr., however.

With both

Kennedys alive and out of the running, I would suggest that
Hubert H. Humphrey would still have made a run in 1968 and would

have won.

William Vanden Heuvel and Milton Gwirtzman in their

book, On His Own: Robert F. Kennedy,

stated that with

RFK alive (despite popular opinion, Kennedy probably would not
have won the nomination) Humphrey should have beaten Nixon.
So, without Vietnam, the RFK assassination, the Chicago riots,
and with a live, two term President, I ,too, believe that the
Democrats would have won in 1968.

Beyond that, not much can

be certain. I am sure, obviously, that without Nixon's election
in 1968, that there would have been no Watergate.

Without

Watergate, there would not have been a President Ford, and
likely, there would not have been a peanut farmer from Georgia
to slide in on the wave of distrust of government.

We would

have probably, in my opinion, seen the nominations of Robert
Kennedy and Ronald Reagan somewhere in time due to their unique
statures, but whether they would have squared off against each
or ever succeeded is impossible to conjecture.
In the end, I have tried to show a world where one man,
serving at a crucial time in history, could seriously alter
the course of events as we know them.

Further, I have given

examples of how the use of Presidential power can effectively
serve as the means for that end.

The office and its power

is aptly described in Robert Shogan's words:
The president bestrides

our political world like a

contemporary Caesar, reaching into the nooks and crannies
of our everyday existence.

He can lead us into war, or

economic ruin, or set us against each other.

Or he can
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help us resolve our differences and generate fresh
confidence and hope.
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